Assume role support #474
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Assume role support #474
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Surface compute service assumability findings at the role level to provide better visibility into roles that can be assumed by EC2, ECS, EKS, or Lambda services, helping security teams identify potential privilege escalation paths through compute services.
Surface cross-account assumability findings at the role level to provide better visibility into roles that can be assumed by principals from other AWS accounts, helping security teams identify potential attack surface expansion beyond organizational boundaries.
Add a new command line flag --flag-trust-policies that allows users to control whether trust policy findings are included in role detail output, providing more granular control over which security findings are reported.
Surface roles that can be assumed by any principal (*) or any AWS account root to provide critical visibility into the most dangerous trust policy configurations, helping security teams immediately identify roles that present the highest risk of unauthorized access from any AWS account.
Surface roles that can be assumed by any principal (*) or any AWS account root when conditions are present to provide enhanced visibility into potentially dangerous trust policy configurations. While conditions may appear to provide security controls, they can be overly permissive or contain logical flaws, helping security teams identify roles that require careful review to ensure conditions adequately restrict access and prevent unintended privilege escalation.
… positives Allow users to specify known AWS account IDs in the exclusions configuration to filter out trusted accounts from cross-account assumability findings, reducing noise from legitimate organizational accounts and third-party vendor accounts while maintaining security visibility for unknown external principals.
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Provide documentation for the three new trust policy findings (AssumableByCrossAccountPrincipal, AssumableByAnyPrincipal, and AssumableByAnyPrincipalWithConditions) to help security teams understand the risks associated with each type of role assumption configuration and provide actionable guidance for remediation and review.
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What does this PR do?
Adds support for flagging risky trust policies in IAM roles, enhancing the tool's ability to detect cross-account and overly permissive role assumptions. The changes introduce a new
flag_trust_policiesoption to both single-account and multi-account scan commands, propagate this flag through the scanning pipeline, and implement logic to identify risky trust policy configurations.These changes make it easier to identify and flag IAM roles with risky trust policies, improving the security posture of scanned AWS environments.
New trust policy risk detection:
--flag-trust-policies(with shorthand-t) to bothscanandscan_multi_accountcommands, allowing users to enable detection of risky trust policies in IAM roles.flag_trust_policiesflag through all relevant functions and classes in the scanning pipeline, includingscan,scan_multi_account,scan_accounts,scan_account,scan_account_authorization_details,AuthorizationDetails, andRoleDetails.Trust policy analysis logic:
AssumeRolePolicyDocumentandAssumeRoleStatementclasses to analyze trust policies, including detection of cross-account principals, wildcard principals, and conditions, enabling identification of risky configurations.What gif best describes this PR or how it makes you feel?
Completion checklist
make test,make lint,make security-test,make test-js)